NASA’s independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) released its 2025 annual report, warning that NASA’s most significant risks do not stem from any single program, but from interrelated pressures such as workforce capabilities, acquisition strategies, technological authority, budget constraints, and the increasing complexity of human spaceflight.
The commission was established by Congress in 1968 in response to the Apollo 1 fire and advises both NASA and lawmakers on safety issues. While the 2025 report acknowledges progress on some key programs, it warns that as missions become more ambitious, risk management must evolve in tandem, especially under the Artemis lunar campaign.
“Independent reviews like this will make NASA better,” said NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman. “The commission’s report highlights areas where standards must be raised, from how we build oversight and manage integrated risks to how we declare and learn from anomalies.”
This year’s review focused on five core areas: NASA’s strategic vision and governance; Moon to Mars program. Future U.S. presence in low Earth orbit (LEO). Health and medical risks in human spaceflight. and the development of the X-59 low-boom flight demonstrator.
The Panel noted progress in Artemis II readiness and appreciated the increased monitoring integration by the Moon and Mars Program Secretariat. It also highlighted continued safe operations on the International Space Station, advances in astronaut health research, and the first flight of the X-59 demonstrator, an important step in efforts to enable quieter supersonic flight over land.
However, the report raised serious concerns. Artemis III is intended to return astronauts to the lunar surface, but is described as a risky position given the technical complexity and schedule pressures. The committee also noted lessons learned from Boeing’s Starliner crew flight test, long-term plans for the space station’s deorbit, and broader organizational challenges across the agency.
To address these pressures, ASAP recommended three priority actions. It’s about realigning the governance of human spaceflight capability acquisition strategies across government agencies. Reconsider the mission objectives and system architecture for Artemis III and subsequent missions to more effectively balance risks. and require timely declaration of incidents or high-profile close calls to improve transparency and corrective action.
Isaacman said NASA is already moving to implement changes in line with the report’s findings, including recalibrating its acquisition strategy to better weigh manufacturing, purchasing and service procurement decisions. He also highlighted workforce initiatives aimed at restoring core technical competencies, including converting some contractor roles to civil service positions and increasing ramp-up frequency to strengthen job proficiency.
The agency recently announced the findings of the Starliner Project Investigation Team, formally classifying the mission as a Type A accident, NASA’s highest accident classification, and outlining corrective actions. Isaacman said the transparency reflects a broader commitment to accountability as NASA moves toward commercial partnerships in low-Earth orbit and works to accelerate its proposal for a human landing system for a planned return to the moon by 2028.
ASAP Chair, retired U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Susan J. Helms, said the committee commends NASA’s efforts to strengthen risk management in 2025 despite organizational turmoil.
As NASA deepens its Moon-to-Mars ambitions and prepares for a future commercial LEO ecosystem, this report reiterates the lessons learned from 60 years of human spaceflight. That means technical achievements alone are not enough. Sustained safety performance depends on governance discipline, clear lines of authority, employee expertise, and a willingness to identify and confront risks before they become operationally manifest.